Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora . These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science . In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will (...) propose a general and systematized account of the Classical Model of Science. Secondly, we will offer an analysis of the philosophical significance of this model at different historical junctures by giving an overview of the connections it has had with a number of important topics. The latter include the analytic-synthetic distinction, the axiomatic method, the hierarchical order of sciences and the status of logic as a science. Our claim is that particularly fruitful insights are gained by seeing themes such as these against the background of the Classical Model of Science. In an appendix we deal with the historiographical background of this model by considering the systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of science offered by Heinrich Scholz, and in his footsteps by Evert W. Beth. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...) that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

Where the possibility of metaphysics as a science is concerned, Kant assigns the exact sciences the function of an exemplar; for these disciplines have long been well established on "the secure path of a science." Accordingly, in the Prolegomena Kant explicitly addresses the question "How is metaphysics possible as a science?" by way of the questions "How is pure mathematics possible?" and "How is pure natural science possible?" Moreover, all these questions arise directly out of the main transcendental question: "How (...) are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" The deplorable situation of the metaphysics of the day would have been entirely attributable to misappraisal of this central transcendental question. (shrink)

Where the possibility of metaphysics as a science is concerned, Kant assigns the exact sciences the function of an exemplar; for these disciplines have long been well established on "the secure path of a science." Accordingly, in the Prolegomena Kant explicitly addresses the question "How is metaphysics possible as a science?" by way of the questions "How is pure mathematics possible?" and "How is pure natural science possible?" Moreover, all these questions arise directly out of the main transcendental question: "How (...) are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" The deplorable situation of the metaphysics of the day would have been entirely attributable to misappraisal of this central transcendental question. (shrink)

Quine's well-known ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) plays a key role in the debate about the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking to task the ideas of Carnap in particular, Quine shows that logical positivism works with a concept of scientific rationality that is based dogmatically on, among other things, the opposition analytic-synthetic.

Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic method is connected to the so-called Aristotelian model of science and has to be interpreted in a (broad) directional sense. With the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments the critical Kant did introduced a new way of using the terms 'analytic'-'synthetic', but one that still lies in line with their directional sense. A careful comparison of the conceptions of the critical Kant with ideas of the precritical Kant as expressed in _Ãœber die Deutlichkeit, leads (...) to the interpretation defended here of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments within his philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

This paper analyses the relationship between Hobbes's theory of language and his theory of science and method. It is shown that Hobbes, at least in his Computatio sive Logica (1655), deviates in some measure from the traditional (Aristotelian) model of language. In this model speech is considered to be a fairly unproblematic expression of thought, which itself is independent of language. Basing himself on a nominalist account of universals, Hobbes states that the demonstration or assertion of universal propositions presupposes speech (...) (more especially, the use of names as marks). This insight turns out to be essential for Hobbes's (rationalist) view of scientific method. (shrink)

Een poging om de geschiedenis van een denkwijze door de eeuwen heen, in dit geval die van het schema van “het midden- en middellijkheidsdenken” , resp. het “denken in termen van ‘midden’ en ‘bemiddeling’” , kritisch in kaart te brengen valt op het eerste gezicht onder het genre Ideengeschichte of history of ideas. Zeker wanneer men ideeëngeschiedenis enerzijds enger, maar anderzijds daarbinnen weer breder opvat dan de invulling die Arthur Lovejoy daaraan gaf in zijn bekende The Great Chain of Being (...) .Het enerzijds betreft de inperking tot het terrein van de filosofie. Het anderzijds raakt hetgeen als idea wordt geaccepteerd. Lovejoy spreekt over ideeën vaak als “unit ideas” en vergt dat deze eenvoudig en ook enkelvoudig zijn. Ik zou in de ideeëngeschiedenis ook ruimte willen maken voor meer complexe filosofische noties, schema’s en zelfs filosofische theorieën. Wel lijkt me dat moet worden vastgehouden aan de eis dat deze ideeën naspeurbaar zijn door filosofische stromingen heen en dat zij bij voorkeur een zekere breedheid vertonen, ook in de zin van toepassing blijken te vinden in meerdere deelgebieden van de filosofie. En hier zij alvast maar genoteerd dat ook Van der Hoeven Lovejoy en diens studie noemt. (shrink)